The Mount Erebus disaster happened on 28 November 1979 when Air New Zealand Flight 901 (TE901) crashed into Mount Erebus on Ross Island, Antarctica. All 237 passengers and 20 crew members on the flight died. Air New Zealand had been offering scheduled Antarctic sightseeing flights since 1977. This flight departed from Auckland Airport in the morning and was planned to spend several hours flying over Antarctica before returning to Auckland in the evening through Christchurch.
The first investigation found the accident was mainly caused by pilot mistakes. However, public concern led to the creation of a Royal Commission of Inquiry to examine the crash. The commission, led by Justice Peter Mahon, determined the crash was mainly due to an automatic correction made to the flight path’s coordinates the night before the disaster. This change was not shared with the flight crew, so the plane was redirected toward Mount Erebus instead of following the planned route down McMurdo Sound. Justice Mahon’s report accused Air New Zealand of presenting "a series of lies," which caused changes in the airline’s leadership. Later, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ruled that the finding of a conspiracy was not supported by evidence and violated natural justice.
This accident remains the deadliest in Air New Zealand’s history, the deadliest aviation accident in Antarctica, and New Zealand’s deadliest peacetime disaster.
Flight and aircraft
Flight 901 was created as a special sightseeing trip to Antarctica. An experienced guide from Antarctica used the plane’s public-address system to explain sights and landmarks to passengers during a low-flying journey over McMurdo Sound. The flight left New Zealand in the morning and returned the same day. The plane departed Auckland International Airport at 8:00 am for Antarctica and was scheduled to return to Christchurch International Airport at 7:00 pm after traveling 8,630 kilometers (5,360 miles). The plane made a 45-minute stop in Christchurch for refueling and crew changes before continuing 747 kilometers (464 miles) to Auckland, arriving at 9:00 pm. Tickets for the November 1979 flights cost NZ$359 per person, which was worth about $2,527 in 2024. Important people, including Sir Edmund Hillary, had served as guides on earlier flights. Hillary was originally scheduled to guide the flight on November 28, 1979, but had to cancel due to other obligations. His friend and climbing partner, Peter Mulgrew, took his place as the guide.
The planes used for Antarctic flights were Air New Zealand’s eight McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30 trijets. The plane involved in the November 28 flight was registered as ZK-NZP. It was the 182nd DC-10 built and the fourth of its kind introduced by Air New Zealand. The plane was delivered to the airline on December 12, 1974, at McDonnell Douglas’s Long Beach plant. Before the crash, it had completed more than 20,700 flight hours. Captain Thomas James “Jim” Collins, 45 years old, had 11,151 flight hours, including 2,872 hours flying the DC-10. First Officer Gregory Mark “Greg” Cassin, 37 years old, had 7,934 flight hours, including 1,361 hours in the DC-10. Flight Engineer Gordon Barrett Brooks, 43 years old, had 10,886 flight hours, including 3,000 hours in the DC-10 (Brooks had also worked as a flight engineer on Air New Zealand’s flight involved in the 1978 Cessna 188 Pacific rescue). Other crew members included First Officer Graham Neville Lucas, 39 years old, and Flight Engineer Nicholas John “Nick” Moloney, 44 years old. Moloney had 6,468 flight hours, including 1,700 hours in the DC-10.
Accident
All times are in New Zealand Standard Time (UTC+12), as recorded at McMurdo Base. At the time of the crash, Mainland New Zealand was using New Zealand Daylight Time (UTC+13).
Captain Collins and co-pilot Cassin had never flown to Antarctica before (flight engineer Brooks had flown to Antarctica once before). However, they were experienced pilots and were considered qualified for the flight. On 9 November 1979, 19 days before departure, the two pilots attended a briefing where they received a copy of the previous flight’s flight plan.
The flight plan had been approved in 1977 by the Civil Aviation Division of the New Zealand Department of Transport. It followed a route directly from Cape Hallett to the McMurdo non-directional beacon (NDB), which passed nearly over the 3,794-meter (12,448-foot) peak of Mount Erebus. However, a typing error in the coordinates when the route was computerized caused the printout from Air New Zealand’s ground computer system, shown during the 9 November briefing, to display a southerly flight path down the middle of McMurdo Sound, about 27 nautical miles (50 km; 31 mi) west of Mount Erebus. Most of the previous 13 flights had also used the same coordinates in their aircraft’s navigation systems, flying the McMurdo Sound route without realizing it did not match the approved route.
Captain Leslie Simpson, who flew on 14 November and attended the 9 November briefing, compared the coordinates of the McMurdo tactical air navigation system (TACAN) beacon (about 5 km or 3 mi east of McMurdo NDB) with the McMurdo waypoint entered into the inertial navigation system (INS) by his flight crew. He noticed a large difference between the two. After his flight, Captain Simpson informed Air New Zealand’s navigation section about the discrepancy. For reasons that were debated, Air New Zealand updated the McMurdo waypoint coordinates in the ground computer system to match the TACAN beacon’s coordinates, even though this did not align with the approved route.
Around 1:40 am on the morning of the flight, Air New Zealand changed the McMurdo waypoint coordinate stored in the ground computer system from 77°53′S 164°48′E (False McMurdo waypoint) to 77°52′0″S 167°03′0″E (McMurdo field waypoint). The flight crew was not informed of this change. The flight plan printout given to the crew on the morning of the flight, which they entered into the aircraft’s INS, differed from the flight plan shown at the 9 November briefing and from Captain Collins’ map mark-ups, which he prepared the night before the fatal flight. The key difference was that the briefing’s flight plan showed a route down McMurdo Sound, avoiding Mount Erebus to the east, while the morning printout showed a route that passed directly over Mount Erebus, which would have resulted in a collision with the 3,794-meter (12,448-foot) peak if the flight altitude was below 4,000 meters (13,000 feet).
Air New Zealand altered its computer program so that the standard telex sent to American air traffic controllers (ATCs) at McMurdo Station displayed the word “McMurdo” instead of the coordinates for the final waypoint. During the inquiry, Justice Mahon concluded that this change was an intentional effort to hide from U.S. authorities that the flight plan had been altered, likely because it was known that U.S. ATC would object to the new flight path.
Earlier in the flight, the plane paused during the approach to McMurdo Sound to descend through a gap in the low cloud base (estimated at around 600 to 900 meters or 2,000 to 3,000 feet) over water to establish visual contact with surface landmarks and improve passenger views. The flight crew either did not know or ignored the approved route’s minimum safe altitude (MSA) of 4,900 meters (16,000 feet) for the approach to Mount Erebus and 1,800 meters (6,000 feet) in the sector south of Mount Erebus (only if the cloud base was at 2,100 meters or higher). Photographs and news stories from previous flights showed that many had flown at altitudes much lower than the MSA. Preflight briefings for earlier flights had also approved descents to any altitude authorized by U.S. ATC at McMurdo Station. Since U.S. ATC expected Flight 901 to follow the same route as previous flights down McMurdo Sound and based on the waypoints previously shared by Air New Zealand, they advised Flight 901 that their radar could allow a descent to 460 meters (1,500 feet). However, the radar did not detect the aircraft, and the crew had trouble establishing VHF communications. The distance measuring equipment also failed to lock onto the McMurdo TACAN for any useful time.
Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcripts from the final minutes of the flight showed that the crew believed they were flying over McMurdo Sound, far west of Mount Erebus, with the Ross Ice Shelf visible on the horizon. In reality, they were flying directly toward the mountain. Despite most crew members being focused on identifying landmarks, they never saw the mountain in front of them. About six minutes after completing a descent in visual meteorological conditions, Flight 901 collided with Mount Erebus at an altitude of around 460 meters (1,500 feet) on the lower slopes of the 3,794-meter (12,448-foot) peak. Passenger photographs taken seconds before the crash showed clear visibility beneath the cloud base, with landmarks 21 kilometers (13 miles) to the left and 16 kilometers (10 miles) to the right of the aircraft, disproving the theory that the crash occurred in clouds.
Collins informed McMurdo Station that he would descend to 2,000 feet (600 meters) and then switched control to the autopilot. Outside, a layer of clouds mixed with the white snow-covered volcano, creating a sector whiteout—where the ground and sky appeared the same to the pilots. This effect misled the crew, making them believe the white mountainside was the Ross Ice Shelf, a large floating ice sheet, which was actually behind the mountain. Air New Zealand had not trained the crew on sector whiteout conditions, and the crew thought they were flying along McMurdo Sound, but they were actually over Lewis Bay in front of Mount Erebus.
At 12:49 pm, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) began sounding alarms, starting with two “whoop” tones followed by an audible command, “Pull up!” warning that the plane was dangerously close to terrain. The CVR recorded the following
Rescue and recovery
At 2:00 pm, the United States Navy shared a report stating that Air New Zealand Flight 901 had not responded to radio messages. One LC-130 plane and two UH-1N helicopters were preparing to search for the missing flight.
At 3:43 pm, new information was added to the report. Visibility was 64 kilometers (40 miles). Six planes had been sent to search for Flight 901.
Flight 901 was scheduled to arrive in Christchurch at 6:05 pm for a stopover that included refueling and a crew change before continuing to Auckland. Around 50 passengers were expected to leave the plane in Christchurch. Airport workers first told families that the flight was slightly late, but later it became clear that something was wrong.
At 9:00 pm, about half an hour after the plane would have run out of fuel, Air New Zealand told the press that the plane was likely lost. Rescue teams searched the area where the flight was expected to be, but found nothing. At 12:55 am, a United States Navy plane crew saw unknown debris near Mount Erebus. No survivors were found. Around 9:00 am, 20 hours after the crash, helicopters landed on the mountain. They confirmed that the wreckage was Flight 901 and that all 237 passengers and 20 crew members had died. The DC-10 plane was at an altitude of 447 meters (1,465 feet) when it crashed.
A section of the plane’s vertical stabilizer, showing the koru logo, was found in the snow. Bodies and parts of the plane were sent to Auckland for identification. The remains of 44 victims could not be individually identified. A funeral was held for them on 22 February 1980.
The recovery effort was named "Operation Overdue." Recovery work was extensive, partly due to pressure from Japan, as 24 passengers were Japanese. The operation lasted until 9 December 1979, with up to 60 workers on site at one time. A team of New Zealand Police officers and a mountain rescue team traveled to the site on a C-130 Hercules plane.
Identifying the remains took many weeks and was done by teams of pathologists, dentists, and police. Inspector Jim Morgan led the mortuary team and prepared a report on the recovery operation. Careful recordkeeping was needed because of the large number of remains and their broken condition. Eventually, 83% of the passengers and crew were identified, sometimes using small clues like fingerprints or keys found in pockets.
Workers lived in tents near the crash site for about a week, working 24 hours a day. They split into two shifts (12 hours on and 12 hours off) and recovered all human remains. Many bodies were trapped under the plane’s fuselage and wings, requiring great effort to dig them out.
At first, there was very little water at the site, and workers used only one bowl to wash their hands before eating. The water was dark. In the early days, workers did not wash dishes after eating but passed them to the next shift because they could not clean them. Workers could not eat their first meal because it was a meat stew. Their clothing became covered in black grease from burned bodies.
Workers felt relieved when wool gloves arrived because their gloves had become soaked in grease. Wool gloves allowed them to write notes and assign numbers to body parts. U.S. Navy photographers took pictures of all remains in place. Navy workers also helped pack bodies into bags, which was very hard work.
Later, gulls began eating the bodies, making it harder to identify them. Workers tried to scare the birds away but failed. They threw flares, but this also did not work. To stop the birds, workers collected all the remains and made 11 piles, which were buried under snow. When the weather improved, helicopters returned to move the remains to McMurdo. This work was very tiring and dangerous because debris was blown by helicopter rotors.
After most of the work was done, workers were trapped by bad weather and isolated. Some workers allowed alcohol to be shared, and they had a party. Workers also ran out of cigarettes, so everyone gave up their supplies to share equally.
When the weather cleared, helicopters returned and carried the remains to McMurdo. This was very hard work because workers had to reduce the number of people on site with each trip, leaving more work for those remaining.
In 2006, the New Zealand Special Service Medal (Erebus) was created to honor New Zealanders, U.S. citizens, and others who helped with the recovery, identification, and investigation of Flight 901. In 2009, the New Zealand government honored 40 U.S. workers, mostly Navy personnel, for their role in the recovery effort.
Inquiries
Flight 901 crashed in a remote area of the world, but the crash site provided a large amount of evidence. Both the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder were working and could be understood. Many passengers had cameras, and extensive photographic footage, including movie film, was collected from before the crash.
The accident report, created by New Zealand’s chief inspector of air accidents, Ron Chippindale, was published on 12 June 1980. It stated that pilot error was the main cause of the crash. The report said the captain, Collins, decided to descend below the required minimum altitude and continued flying at that altitude even though the crew was unsure of the plane’s location. The usual rule required flying at least 1,800 metres (6,000 ft) above the ground, even in good weather. However, the captain believed the plane was over the sea, near McMurdo Sound and small islands. Previous pilots on Flight 901 had often flown low over the area to give passengers a better view, as shown in Air New Zealand’s travel magazine and confirmed by people at Scott Base.
Because of public interest, the New Zealand government started another investigation led by Justice Peter Mahon. This inquiry faced challenges because the deadline was very short, set for 31 October 1980, but it was extended four times. The report was released on 27 April 1981 and found that the crew was not to blame. Mahon concluded that the main cause of the crash was Air New Zealand changing the flight plan’s coordinates in the navigation computer without telling the crew. The new plan directed the plane over a mountain instead of along its side. Due to poor weather conditions, called a “whiteout,” the crew could not see the mountain. They may have also seen a rare weather phenomenon called a sector whiteout, which creates the illusion of a flat horizon far away. A gap between clouds allowed the crew to see the Ross Ice Shelf, which may have misled them. Mahon noted that the crew had many years of experience and trusted the plane’s navigation system. He also found that earlier flights had been allowed to descend to 600 metres (2,000 ft), below the required minimum altitude, by the US air traffic control at McMurdo Station.
Mahon’s report stated that airline leaders and senior pilots had hidden the truth by lying to investigators. He criticized Chippindale for lacking knowledge about jet airline operations, as Chippindale and the New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority usually investigated crashes involving small planes, not large aircraft.
Court proceedings
On May 20, 1981, Air New Zealand asked the High Court of New Zealand to review Mahon's decision that the airline must pay more than half the costs of the Mahon inquiry. Air New Zealand also asked the court to review some of the facts Mahon included in his report. The case was sent to the Court of Appeal, which agreed to cancel the order requiring Air New Zealand to pay most of the inquiry's costs. However, the Court of Appeal did not cancel Mahon's finding that Air New Zealand managers had worked together to lie during the inquiry to hide mistakes made by ground staff.
Mahon then asked the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London to review the Court of Appeal's decision. Mahon's conclusion that the crash was caused by the flight crew being given incorrect information about their flight path, not by pilot error, was not challenged by the Court of Appeal or the Privy Council.
Regarding Air New Zealand’s rule requiring pilots to fly at least 6,000 feet near McMurdo Base, the Judicial Committee said that some pilots had given false testimony during the inquiry. However, the committee believed these pilots were not intentionally lying as part of a plan to deceive. The committee also said there was no clear evidence to support Mahon’s claim that Air New Zealand managers had conspired to cover up mistakes.
In its decision on October 20, 1983, the Judicial Committee rejected Mahon’s appeal. Aviation researcher John King wrote in his book New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation that the committee disproved Mahon’s claim of a cover-up, including evidence from Exhibit 164. This exhibit was a copy of a diagram showing flight paths near Ross Island. The diagram did not show how the paths connected, leaving them separate. Evidence suggested the diagram had been included in flight crew materials, but the committee said it was not useful for navigation.
Legacy of the disaster
The crash of Flight 901 is one of New Zealand's three deadliest disasters. The other two are the 1874 Cospatrick sailing ship disaster, which killed 470 people, and the 1931 Hawke's Bay earthquake, which killed 256 people. At the time of the crash, it was the fourth deadliest air crash in history. As of January 2025, the crash remains Air New Zealand's deadliest accident and New Zealand's deadliest peacetime disaster, excluding the Cospatrick disaster, which occurred far from New Zealand.
Flight 901, along with the earlier crash of American Airlines Flight 191 in Chicago on May 25, hurt the reputation of the McDonnell Douglas DC-10. After the Chicago crash, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) removed the DC-10's type certificate on June 6. This action stopped all U.S.-registered DC-10s from flying and prevented foreign governments with agreements with the U.S. from operating their DC-10s, including Air New Zealand's seven DC-10s. Air New Zealand's DC-10s remained grounded until July 13, when the FAA allowed them to return to service after all airlines completed safety modifications based on the Chicago crash investigation.
Flight 901 was the third deadliest accident involving a DC-10, following Turkish Airlines Flight 981 and American Airlines Flight 191. This event marked the end of Air New Zealand's use of DC-10s, even though plans to replace them had already begun. DC-10s were replaced by Boeing 747s starting in mid-1981, and the last Air New Zealand DC-10 flew in December 1982. The crash also ended commercially operated Antarctic sightseeing flights. Air New Zealand stopped all Antarctic flights after the crash, and Qantas paused its Antarctic flights in February 1980. Qantas later resumed limited Antarctic flights in 1994.
Most of the aircraft's wreckage still remains on the slopes of Mount Erebus. Its remote location and harsh weather make recovery difficult. During cold periods, snow and ice cover the wreckage. During warmer periods, the wreckage becomes visible from the air.
After the crash, all charter flights to Antarctica from New Zealand stopped. These flights did not resume until 2013, when a Boeing 747-400 chartered from Qantas flew from Auckland for a sightseeing trip over Antarctica.
Justice Mahon's report was presented to Parliament by the then-Minister of Transport, Maurice Williamson, in 1999.
In June 2007, Captain Gordon Vette was honored with the ONZM (Officer of the New Zealand Order of Merit) for his help during the Erebus inquiry. His book, Impact Erebus, describes the flight, crash, and investigations.
In 2008, Justice Mahon was posthumously awarded the Jim Collins Memorial Award by the New Zealand Airline Pilots Association for his work improving air safety worldwide.
In 2009, Air New Zealand's CEO, Rob Fyfe, apologized to those affected by the lack of support from the company after the crash. He also unveiled a memorial sculpture at the company's headquarters.
On November 28, 2019, New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and the government formally apologized to the families of the crash victims. Ardern said, "I express regret on behalf of Air New Zealand for the accident" and "apologize on behalf of the airline which 40 years ago failed in its duty of care to its passengers and staff."
The registration number of the crashed aircraft, ZK-NZP, has not been reused.
Memorials
A wooden cross was built on the mountain above Scott Base to honor the accident. In 1986, it was replaced with an aluminum cross because the original was worn away by cold weather, wind, and moisture.
A memorial for the 16 passengers whose remains could not be identified and the 28 whose bodies were never found is located at Waikumete Cemetery in Glen Eden, Auckland. It was dedicated one year after the tragedy, in November 1980. A Japanese cherry tree was planted next to the memorial to honor the 24 Japanese passengers who died on Flight 901.
A memorial for the crew members of Flight 901 is near Auckland Airport, on Tom Pearce Drive at the eastern end of the airport area.
On 4 December 1979, six days after the crash, St Matthews in the City Church held a memorial service for the victims. Before the 10th anniversary of the disaster, a stained glass window was added to the church and dedicated to the 257 people who died.
To mark the 25th anniversary of the Erebus disaster, a wreath-laying ceremony and memorial service were held in Antarctica in 2004.
In January 2010, a 26-kilogram (57 lb) sculpted koru with letters from the loved ones of the victims was placed next to the Antarctic cross. It was originally planned to be placed at the site by six relatives of the victims on 28 November 2009, but this was delayed for two months due to bad weather. A second koru capsule, similar to the first, was planned to be placed at Scott Base in 2011.
The book-length poem "Erebus" by American writer Jane Summer (Sibling Rivalry Press, 2015) honors a close friend who died in the tragedy and explores the series of mistakes that led to the crash.
In 2019, it was announced that a national memorial would be built in Parnell Rose Gardens. A relative of a crash victim said the location was appropriate, but local residents opposed it, saying it would harm the park’s atmosphere. Construction was planned to begin in October 2021, but delays occurred due to protests over concerns about damaging giant pōhutukawa trees.
In March 2022, the Ombudsman reported that the Ministry of Culture & Heritage did not consult enough people before choosing the location and failed to respond to questions about the memorial’s approval. Construction was paused until the ministry resolved any concerns. By 10 February 2023, the Ombudsman confirmed that the ministry had addressed these issues.
However, the 2023 Auckland Anniversary Weekend floods and Cyclone Gabrielle caused landslides near the planned memorial site. A geotechnical assessment found the land unsafe for construction, leading to the cancellation of the Parnell Rose Gardens plan. In November 2025, the Ministry announced that the preferred new site for the national memorial would be Cracroft Reserve in Christchurch. The Mayor of Christchurch, Phil Mauger, had previously suggested Cracroft Reserve as a possible location. Christchurch was the first place in New Zealand where the plane landed on its return flight.
In popular culture
The crash happened at the same time as the Air New Zealand Shell Open, a golf tournament supported by Air New Zealand. The company’s CEO, Morrie Davis, was participating in a professional and amateur event when he first learned that the plane was "lost." Air New Zealand considered canceling the tournament but chose not to.
A television miniseries called Erebus: The Aftermath, which focused on the investigation and a special commission that looked into the event, was shown in New Zealand and Australia in 1988.
The phrase "an orchestrated litany of lies" became part of New Zealand’s popular culture for several years.
In 2014, a full-length documentary called Operation Overdue, about the disaster, was created for TVNZ. It highlighted the recovery mission with the same name and 11 police officers who helped retrieve victims’ remains. In 2019, two detailed podcast series were produced by Radio New Zealand and The New Zealand Herald to mark the 40th anniversary of the disaster.
The disaster is covered in the fifth episode of season two of Why Planes Crash, a documentary series by The Weather Channel. The episode is titled "Sudden Impact" and was first shown in January 2015.
In March 2026, the disaster was included in an episode of the "Cautionary Tales" podcast.
Official records
Materials about the Erebus disaster and the related inquiry are kept by Archives New Zealand in Christchurch, along with other Antarctic materials from the Antarctic Division of the former Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR). There are 168 record items, of which twelve cannot be accessed by the public (7 photos, 4 audio cassettes, and 1 file of newspaper clippings from Air New Zealand).
Other files are stored by Archives New Zealand in Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin. These include records from the Royal Commission (Agency AASJ, accession W2802) and the New Zealand Police (Agencies AAAJ, BBAN; many of these are also restricted).